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The UN Was Built for a World of Nations. Can It Survive a World of Nations First?
The General Assembly’s committees were built to reconcile sovereign interests. Their future depends on making cooperation more accountable, not abandoning it.
Austin Wallace

Opinion by Austin Wallace. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute a statement of WFA policy. Historical and institutional sources are linked below.
The General Assembly’s committees were built to reconcile sovereign interests. Their future depends on making cooperation more accountable, not abandoning it.
The United Nations is usually judged by its most visible moments: a leader at the General Assembly podium, a Security Council veto, a resolution adopted while a war continues. But much of its political work happens elsewhere, in committees where governments negotiate the language through which they define a problem and decide what they are prepared to do about it.
That quieter system deserves closer attention. If we want to understand why the UN struggles, and what might still give it a future, we need to look beyond the speeches.
I do not believe the answer is to defend every meeting or every resolution simply because it is multilateral. The UN must be able to explain what its work changes. But dismissing the committees as bureaucracy misses the political bargain they were designed to sustain: countries with different interests still need somewhere to negotiate common rules.
A system born from sovereign states
The UN emerged in 1945 from the devastation of the Second World War. Its Charter placed sovereign equality alongside obligations to settle disputes peacefully and refrain from the threat or use of force. It did not abolish national interests. It sought to establish limits on how states pursued them. [1]
The General Assembly’s committee system translated that bargain into working arrangements. The Charter gave the Assembly authority to adopt its own rules and establish necessary subsidiary organs; it did not enumerate today’s six Main Committees. At its first session in London in 1946, the Assembly established six committees under provisional rules developed through the Preparatory Commission. Their portfolios divided political and security matters, economic and financial questions, social and humanitarian issues, trusteeship, administration and budgets, and law. [2]
The reason was practical. An assembly could debate the world’s problems in plenary, but detailed work required a division of labour.
Today, the First Committee covers disarmament and international security; the Second economic and financial matters; the Third social, humanitarian and cultural questions, including human rights; the Fourth special political and decolonization matters; the Fifth administration and budgets; and the Sixth law. All UN member states can participate in each. Their recommendations go to the Assembly’s plenary for action. [3]
This is an important distinction. These committees are not six independent governments, and a committee vote is not the same thing as final Assembly adoption. Nor does an Assembly resolution automatically become binding international law. Much of the Assembly’s external role is recommendatory, although it also has specific Charter powers, including approval of the Organization’s budget. [4]
Its influence is therefore often cumulative: identifying an issue, building support, establishing expectations and creating pressure for further action.
Who gets to shape the rules?
The system’s history also complicates the idea that the UN belongs to a fixed Western order.
The Organization began while colonial empires still controlled much of the world. Its membership and politics changed as those empires receded. In 1960 alone, the UN admitted seventeen new members, sixteen of them newly independent African states. That December, the General Assembly adopted its declaration on independence for colonial countries and peoples. [5]
This did not erase inequality. It did change who could speak, organize and vote inside the institution.
For countries without the economic or military leverage of a major power, participation in committees creates a route to influence through coalitions, expertise and persistence. A small state cannot make itself a great power by submitting an amendment. It can, however, help determine which concerns become part of an international agenda.
The structure itself has changed. In 1993, the Special Political Committee and the Fourth Committee were merged, producing the present Special Political and Decolonization Committee. The system we have is the result of political decisions, not an untouchable blueprint. [3]
We should remember that when discussing reform. Procedures can be changed without abandoning the principle that every member state deserves a place in the discussion.
When national interest becomes national exclusivity
Governments are expected to represent their citizens. The problem begins when national interest is defined so narrowly that cooperation itself becomes suspect.
There is a difference between entering a negotiation to secure a fair outcome for your country and entering it on the assumption that any concession is a defeat. The second approach leaves little room for durable agreements, because it denies other countries the legitimacy of their own interests.
That matters especially for problems whose consequences cross borders. A government can choose its negotiating position on climate, public health or environmental degradation. It cannot make those problems respect its jurisdiction.
The same is true of the relationship between human, animal and environmental health. Treating these as disconnected subjects may make an agenda easier to divide, but it makes shared risks harder to understand. This is one reason I see value in bringing a One Health perspective into international discussions.
A politics of “nation only” offers a promise of control while overlooking the conditions on which that control depends. Countries need reliable neighbours, functioning institutions and some confidence that agreements will outlast the political advantage of breaking them.
The committees cannot create that confidence on their own. They can keep negotiations open and make disagreement visible. They can also reveal when a government is willing to endorse a principle in public but unwilling to support its implementation.
The criticism the UN must take seriously
There is a legitimate frustration with a system that can produce repeated statements without an obvious improvement in people’s lives.
Language matters, but language is not delivery. A negotiation can preserve an important commitment, yet still leave the institutions responsible for implementing it without sufficient money or capacity. Repeating a resolution can keep a neglected issue alive. It can also become a substitute for deciding what should happen next.
These are not merely criticisms from outside. The UN’s own mandate implementation review has identified duplication, fragmented delivery, coordination problems and a widening gap between mandates and resources. In March 2026, the Assembly adopted resolution 80/251 on improving mandate creation, implementation and review as part of the UN80 reform effort. [6]
The question is whether governments will apply that discipline to their own priorities as readily as they apply it to everyone else’s.
I would judge reform by three tests.
First, does it make the connection between a decision and its intended result clearer? A new commitment should identify what is expected, who can implement it and how progress will be assessed.
Second, does it protect meaningful participation? Streamlining work should help smaller delegations follow negotiations, rather than move important decisions into less accessible settings. Earlier circulation of drafts, clearer schedules and less unnecessary duplication would be practical improvements.
Third, does it confront the relationship between ambition and resources? Governments cannot continually enlarge expectations while treating implementation as someone else’s financial problem.
None of this requires pretending that consensus is always the best outcome. Agreement achieved by stripping away every meaningful commitment can conceal a failure. An honest account of disagreement can sometimes be more useful than a unanimous text that promises little.
What kind of UN survives?
I see a real risk that the UN survives formally while becoming less consequential: the meetings continue, but the decisions that matter move into smaller groups where access depends increasingly on wealth, military strength or strategic usefulness.
Smaller coalitions have a role. They can act when universal negotiations stall. But they cannot offer the same claim to representation as an institution where every member state has a seat.
The future should combine more effective cooperation with a credible universal forum, rather than force a choice between them. Committees need to become easier to follow, more disciplined about their workload and more explicit about what has, and has not, been achieved.
Defending multilateralism should never mean protecting an institution from scrutiny. It should mean being serious about why cooperation is necessary and equally serious about whether the arrangements we have are working.
The UN was created for a world of sovereign nations. Its future depends on whether those nations still recognize that some of their most important interests can only be secured together.
Sources
- 1. UN Charter, Articles 1–2
- 2. New Zealand delegation’s official report on the first General Assembly session, 1946
- 3. UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library: General Assembly Main Committees, including 1993 merger
- 4. UN Charter, Articles 9–22, including Articles 10, 17, 21 and 22
- 5. UN Library: 1956–1965, decolonization and membership
- 6. UN80 mandate implementation review and General Assembly resolution 80/251
- 6a. UN80 Ad Hoc Working Group: adoption of resolution 80/251 on 31 March 2026